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Abstract
As long as vehicles do not provide full automation, the design and function of the Human Machine Interface (HMI) is crucial 
for ensuring that the human “driver” and the vehicle-based automated systems collaborate in a safe manner. When the driver 
is decoupled from active control, the design of the HMI becomes even more critical. Without mutual understanding, the 
two agents (human and vehicle) will fail to accurately comprehend each other’s intentions and actions. This paper proposes 
a set of design principles for in-vehicle HMI and reviews some current HMI designs in the light of those principles. We 
argue that in many respects, the current designs fall short of best practice and have the potential to confuse the driver. This 
can lead to a mismatch between the operation of the automation in the light of the current external situation and the driver’s 
awareness of how well the automation is currently handling that situation. A model to illustrate how the various principles 
are interrelated is proposed. Finally, recommendations are made on how, building on each principle, HMI design solutions 
can be adopted to address these challenges.
Keywords Automated driving · HMI · Vehicle design · Safety
1 Introduction
There is a huge push of automated driving functionality, 
with many manufacturers indicating their intention to bring 
highly automated cars to the market in the near future. 
Vehicles that are truly driverless have no requirement to 
be operated directly by a human via active controls, apart 
from the input of the required destination or a need, in the 
unlikely event of an emergency stop, to overrule the entire 
system. However, for the foreseeable future there will be 
an extremely wide variety of non-driverless vehicles, ofer-
ing diferent levels of automation functionality. The correct 
functioning of that automation depends on the collaboration 
between human and vehicle. If that collaboration works as 
intended, the human driver can surrender some, most or all 
driving control to the vehicle, and the vehicle can similarly 
require human takeover in the event of failure or system 
awareness that it cannot handle the current or an upcoming 
situation. Alternatively, the human may request to take over 
and be granted that request by the vehicle.
With these automated functions, the vehicle and human 
can be seen as a joint cognitive system, with both elements 
required to collaborate to deliver safe and comfortable driv-
ing. The main communication means between vehicle and 
human in that collaboration is the human machine interface 
(HMI). That HMI cannot be seen narrowly as just a set of 
visual and auditory displays which relay information and set-
tings in both directions. It also includes all the vehicle con-
trols, since those controls provide channels for both human 
input into the vehicle and for vehicle feedback to the driver. 
The feedback can include both the traditional feel transmit-
ted by pedals and steering, but also the vehicle’s dynamics 
within a speciic context and additional haptic elements—
resistance, pulses, vibrations, physical guidance—used 
to guide and assist the human. The term “HMI” will here 
be used in that broad sense to encompass the full range of 
explicit as well as implicit communication between human 
operator and the vehicle.
Drivers of vehicles with automated functions may not 
understand that these systems cannot work in all conditions. 
Therefore, there is a fundamental need for the HMI to help 
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the human to understand the capabilities of the automated 
functions as these functions vary over time. The role of the 
HMI is to make humans understand what is expected of 
them in terms of monitoring and active intervention. Such 
understanding is a pre-requisite for correctly calibrated trust 
and indeed for safe and comfortable operation in general. 
Misunderstanding between the vehicle and the human about 
what the other party will do has the potential to result in 
false expectations on the part of the system about what the 
human will notice, as well as over-reliance by the human 
on system capability and consequent disaster, as evidenced 
by the fatal crash of a Tesla in Florida in May 2016. At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, if users have too little trust in 
system capabilities, they may decide not to buy or use sys-
tems that could potentially be helpful and safety-enhancing.
We can establish goals for the HMI that are needed to 
achieve this transparency, along the lines of the “ten chal-
lenges” of Klein et al. (2004). Their ten challenges were 
based on four principles for the proper operation of a joint 
human-agent activity: there should be an agreement that 
the actors will work together; the actors must be mutually 
predictable in their actions; they must be mutually direct-
able; and they must maintain common ground. The indi-
vidual goals laid out in this paper are based on the overriding 
principle for road vehicle operation that the top-level goal 
should be to ensure the overall safety of the joint system, 
by providing the human supervisor with suicient under-
standing of how the automation is operating and of what 
is expected of the human. That understanding of necessity 
encompasses both the state and status of the automation and 
the relationship between the automation and the external 
road, traic and weather environment. Since at higher levels 
of automation, the automated vehicles may be making deci-
sions at all three levels of the driving task (strategic, tacti-
cal and control—Michon 1985), there is an argument for a 
need to inform the human about each level. However, when 
referring to a joint cognitive system, both elements of the 
system need to take the other into account and not just ofer 
one-way communication about all actions. The assumption 
that the human wants to be informed about every level of the 
automated driving task and will be constantly monitoring or 
supervising the system is, therefore, not the right approach 
and needs to be discussed. The role for the HMI is not only 
to provide information to a highly alert monitor, but also to 
ensure that the attention level is suicient and that mutual 
expectations are correct.
Many studies report the HMIs they have used for their 
research, but there is remarkably little systematic research 
about the overall requirements and design of HMI for auto-
mated vehicles and no general review of principles and over-
all user needs. The European HAVEit project carried out a 
driving simulator study to evaluate a number of proposed 
designs to handle driver-initiated transitions of automated 
driving (Schieben et al. 2011) and also initiated an HMI 
design process to arrive at prototype designs for the project’s 
demonstrator automated vehicles (Flemisch et al. 2011). 
Bengler et al. (2012) proposed that multi-modal interfaces 
including haptic should be used in human–machine coopera-
tion, for example with driver assistance systems, but did not 
provide any further speciics. In the U.S., a NHTSA-funded 
project investigated a number of speciic human factors chal-
lenges for level 2 and level 3 vehicles, using prototype vehi-
cles operating on a test track (Blanco et al. 2015). The irst 
challenge was how to issue a take-over request to the human 
in level 2 driving; the second was how to prompt operators 
to pay attention to the roadway in level 2 driving; and the 
third was how to issue a take-over request in level 3 driving. 
These studies are valuable, but they by no means address 
the overall requirements of an HMI to support operators as 
they share driving with an automated system. Additionally, 
there is a commercial report by Fitch (2015) which reviews 
current concepts and designs for the HMI for automated 
vehicles and includes statements made by a number of sys-
tem developers and researchers. The report recognises the 
importance of HMI for safe vehicle operation, sees HMI 
as a unique feature to diferentiate automotive brands and 
encourages a user-centred and careful design approach. It 
does not provide a conclusive a set of overriding principles 
for HMI in this particular context or make recommendations 
on appropriate, or for that matter inappropriate, designs.
2  What should be the goals of HMI for AVs?
In designing an HMI, it is pertinent to apply ecological 
interface design (EID) principles (Rasmussen and Vicente 
1989; Vicente and Rasmussen 1992). The goal is to prevent 
insofar as possible escalation to higher levels of cognitive 
control, i.e. to maintain the human at the skills and, where 
needed, the rules levels, and thus to avoid the slower and 
less efective (and thus potentially more unsafe) knowledge 
level (for more information about the skill-based, rule-based 
and knowledge-based behaviour hierarchy, see Rasmussen 
1983, 1987). In other words, relexes are to be preferred 
over relection. Here, as carried out by Vicente and Ras-
mussen (1992) for general interface design, it is possible 
to identify the major challenges presented by collaboration 
of vehicle and human in automated driving and, from those 
challenges, derive design principles or goals. As indicated 
above, a similar process was adopted by Klein et al. (2004) 
for automation in general.
The identiied elements, crucial for HMI design in auto-
mated vehicles, are each discussed separately in this paper. 
They are:
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1. Provide required understanding of the AV capabilities 
and status (minimise mode errors).
2. Engender correct calibration of trust.
3. Stimulate appropriate level of attention and intervention.
4. Minimise automation surprises.
5. Provide comfort to the human user, i.e. reduce uncer-
tainty and stress.
6. Be usable.
After discussing these requirements, a simpliied model 
of the impact of these items is presented, together with 
implications for HMI design.
3  Provide required understanding of the AV 
capabilities and status
It is a basic requirement for the human operator, when work-
ing with automation, to comprehend what automated func-
tionalities are being provided by the vehicle, and in counter-
part what is expected of the human in terms of supervision, 
attention to both automation state and status and readiness 
to resume control. If a vehicle is operating in driverless auto-
mation, with no requirement for human attention or interven-
tion, then indeed the human can be totally disengaged from 
driving, i.e. be a mere passenger who can be immersed in 
any non-driving tasks or even asleep. If properly designed, 
the passenger then requires only journey-related (strate-
gic) information as defined by Michon (1985) together 
with information about costs, ride sharing or emergency 
situations.
On the other hand, when take-over might be needed (SAE 
level 3, conditional automation, or level 4, high automation) 
or when supervision is required (SAE level 2, partial auto-
mation), then the human has a set of information needs that 
need to be provided by the visual and acoustic displays of the 
HMI, as well as potentially by haptics in the form of vibra-
tions in the seat and longitudinal or lateral jerks instigated by 
the vehicle control. The human will also feel vehicle behav-
iour, e.g. potentially be alerted to altered traic conditions 
by sensing the deceleration and acceleration of the vehicle. 
At lower levels of automation, up to level 3, the human is the 
main fallback. The nominal diference between SAE levels 
2 and 3 is that in the former the human is responsible for 
monitoring the driving environment, whereas in the latter 
the system has that responsibility and supposedly alerts the 
human when intervention is required.
That distinction is both highly technical and highly tenu-
ous. It almost suggests that for level 3 driving, continuous 
display of how the automation is interacting with the exter-
nal environment is not needed, which if followed would lead 
to near-complete human disengagement from vehicle opera-
tion. A number of questions can be asked:
• Can the human understand the implications of the difer-
ences between level 2 and level 3 automation?
• How is the human supposed to know what action might 
be required if he/she is not monitoring the environment 
and, therefore, both physically decoupled from the vehi-
cle and mentally decoupled if not required to pay atten-
tion?
• Without an HMI to provide information about current 
automation status and preview of automation actions, 
how is the human supposed to comprehend the interac-
tion between “the driving environment” and the automa-
tion?
• How is the human supposed to know the current capabil-
ity of the automated systems—which features are enabled 
and which are not?
Certainly, it can neither be expected that the human will 
understand the impact of the levels on every day driving 
situations, nor indeed that declaring to the human what 
exact level of automation is currently enabled or available 
for selection will be useful. The levels are far too coarse to 
be helpful and do not indicate anything about what func-
tionality is in operation. The human might want to know 
whether the vehicle is performing longitudinal control (ACC 
and stop and go functionality), whether it is controlling lane-
keeping, whether it has the ability and authority to change 
lane, whether it can overtake a lead vehicle and what other 
manoeuvres it can perform (e.g. handling intersections and 
roundabouts). Those authorities are by no means indicated 
by the SAE levels, but are the ones that a human driver 
would understand. Given the huge number of tasks and sub-
tasks involved in driving (McKnight and Adams 1970), it is 
clearly not feasible to convey to the human whether the vehi-
cle is capable of performing each separate element. Even 
more so, it may be that a vehicle can handle one situation but 
cannot handle a similar or even identical one. At a minimum, 
it is necessary to indicate whether the vehicle under automa-
tion can handle longitudinal and lateral vehicle control under 
the current conditions, whether it can manoeuvre in the cur-
rent environment and situation (e.g. handle a roundabout) 
and whether it can perform strategic aspects of driving (i.e. 
switch from one road to another or change route). Without 
indication and consequent comprehension, there is a likeli-
hood of mode confusion and resulting mode errors, which 
could just be annoying but could also be dangerous if the 
automation is expecting an action that the human fails to 
perform or if the human believes that the automation has 
more capability than it actually has. Marketing by OEMs can 
contribute to such confusion. The labelling by Tesla of their 
level 2 driver support as “Autopilot” may have contributed 
to the circumstances behind the fatal crash in Florida in May 
2017. Additionally, the proliferation of names and trade-
marks for similar functionality is not helpful: BMW market 
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their automated functions as partly or fully automated driv-
ing; the Volvo V90 is branded as semi-autonomous; and 
many media or blogs refer to self-driving vehicles when in 
fact they are discussing partially automated functions.
To provide people with feedback about level 2 function-
ality and what the human is supposed to do, a visual inter-
face is typically presented in current commercially available 
systems. The most basic feedback a system can provide is 
showing whether the system or a function is activated or not. 
To avoid mode confusion, it should be possible to ascer-
tain this with one short glance. A second detail is whether 
the system can detect the required input to be able to per-
form the requested task (quality of performance when on). 
Most road users will not look for this information since they 
assume that the system will function well once it is switched 
on. Although most SAE level 2 systems (lane centring and 
ACC) are designed in a way that system activation by the 
driver is prevented when road markings or lane edges are not 
detected, detectable warnings may not be provided when the 
system, after having been switched on by the driver, loses 
the detection of road markings. This is a concept that is 
very diicult for people to grasp and leaves room for major 
improvement. Users are likely to assume that, when the sys-
tem is on, it will function well, and, if not, a warning will 
be provided.
It is useful here to refer to some speciic current designs 
of HMIs for level 2 systems. Most current vehicle displays 
show a green/yellow/blue steering wheel when the system 
is on and road markings or lane edges are detected (see 
Fig. 1). Some brands (e.g. Tesla and BMW) also show the 
road markings/lane edges in colour when properly detected 
and in grey or white when not properly detected. Some 
examples are provided in Fig. 1. Note that all the indications 
depicted here and in subsequent igures are shown either in 
the normal dashboard area and are sometimes duplicated in 
a dedicated screen just above the dashboard in the driver’s 
forward ield of view.
Neither the Volvo S90 nor the Mercedes E show the spe-
ciic detection of road markings or lane edges. In both cases, 
the steering wheel turns grey when it is switched on but not 
working properly. This is a very subtle change from green 
to grey, especially if no auditory warnings are emitted. In 
case a system falls out of automation without any auditory 
warning, this leaves the driver to only discover that the sys-
tem has been switched of when noticing vehicle drift on 
the road. Especially since a driver should be monitoring the 
road, this change in symbol would not be detected other 
than by chance or by constantly checking the display and not 
looking outside. A head-up display, as some brands provide, 
reduces the eyes-of-road time. Some vehicles provide an 
auditory warning when falling out of automation only if the 
driver does not hold the steering wheel.
Tesla provides a more advanced display, with additional 
information for the driver to understand what the vehicle 
is detecting (Fig. 2). This means that it actually provides 
detailed information of the position of the ego and surround-
ing vehicles in the lanes, the type of road markings and the 
relative position of the own vehicle compared to vehicles in 
other lanes, as well as the vehicle in front of the lead car. 
Although this is very interesting for a driver to observe to 
Fig. 1  The Volvo S90, Mercedes E Class, the Tesla and BMW 7 Series indications of activated steering (in the Volvo case without ACC) and 
proper detection of road markings (Photos copyright UTAC CERAM and FONDATION MAIF)
Fig. 2  T Model S with latest update of extended Autopilot func-
tion (version 8.1) showing a detailed image of what the vehicle sees 
around it (copyright Tesla.com)
Cognition, Technology & Work 
1 3
increase trust in automation (‘do not worry as the vehicle 
has seen all this’), it is quite detailed for a level 2 system. 
Since in level 2 the driver needs to be ready to intervene at 
any time, it is diicult for a driver to understand what the 
vehicles does not detect. Only by inferring what the system 
does not see, might a driver be able to igure out what that 
means in terms of traic safety and required action. Addi-
tionally, it visually and cognitively distracts the driver for 
longer times, whereas at level 2 the driver needs to look 
outside at the road. Therefore, the visual display seems to be 
more suitable to build up trust than to ensure that drivers are 
ready to intervene at the right moment. Arguably, it would 
be more appropriate for a level 3 and 4 function.
4  Engender correct calibration of trust
Trust in automation is commonly described as an important 
factor for system use and acceptance. If drivers do not trust 
the systems (undertrust), they will not buy them or activate 
them. Trust, once lost, is hard to regain (Muir 1994). With 
undertrust, functions may be overruled when the system 
could actually have coped, negatively afecting acceptance, 
comfort and possibly even safety. However, if drivers over-
trust the functionalities, this may certainly lead to unsafe 
situations. Various studies have shown that drivers are 
more engaged in secondary tasks while driving with ACC 
or highly automated functions, and pay less attention to the 
road, even if they are being told that the systems may fail. 
The internet is full of videos showing overtrust, with people 
engaging automated functions and then leaving their seat or 
sabotaging hands-on wheel requests. Such videos have the 
potential to inspire misconceptions about the capability of 
information and hence inspire misuse. Studies have shown 
up to three times as much non-driving related tasks when 
driving with ACC (Malta et al. 2012), 30–70% less eyes-
on-the-road time with highly automated driving (de Winter 
et al. 2014), and people falling asleep on test tracks despite 
being warned that the system may fail (Omae et al. 2005). 
In case of system failure just before a curve, participants 
were not able to keep the vehicle on the road (Flemisch et al. 
2008) (for an overview of more of these examples, see de 
Winter et al. 2014).
Trust has been referred to as having many different 
meanings (Williamson 1993), deinitions being a confusing 
potpourri (Shapiro 1987) and leading to conceptual confu-
sion (Lewis and Weigert 1985). Therefore, it is important 
to deine here with what we mean by trust in automation 
and in our case speciically about trust in automated driving 
functions from the driver perspective.
In our deinition, trust in automation is “having coni-
dence that the system will act according to what the driver 
expects it to do with additional beneits of this system for 
the driver”. The aspect of additional beneits for the driver 
needs to be added in the deinition, since just having the 
right expectations does not lead to trust if this means that 
the system is correctly perceived as not working well. This 
also links with the deinition used by Verberne et al. (2015), 
describing trust in automated systems as “…an antecedent 
to reliant behaviour, a willingness to accept vulnerability 
in expectation of a positive outcome”. Verberne adjusted 
his deinition for automated vehicles based on Mayer et al. 
(1995) who used vulnerability to the action of another party.
Lee and See (2004) speciied calibration of trust as one 
of three components of appropriate trust. They described 
calibration of trust as having accurate knowledge of the sys-
tem’s capabilities. Calibration is needed for a driver to know 
when human action is required. However, there is more to 
trust calibration than just avoiding overtrust and undertrust. 
Trust may be perfectly calibrated with a system that is very 
unreliable. In that case there is a very low level of trust, 
but well calibrated. One could even argue that undertrust is 
good for traic safety since the driver will have a high level 
of attention and a high readiness to take back control. So 
although trust calibration is an important issue in automated 
driving, a minimum level of trust seems to be required to 
have any beneits for the user, and overtrust is more danger-
ous than undertrust.
Trust is not a unidimensional or a binary concept, either 
being present or absent. Especially when we refer to trust 
in vehicle automation, trust is best relected in actual driv-
ing situations, since the level of trust in automated driving 
is likely to be related to speciic scenarios (approaching an 
intersection with crossing pedestrians or driving straight on 
a motorway), the settings and characteristics of the vehicle 
(e.g. maximum speed set by the driver, acceleration pro-
ile) and whether a driver has experience with the speciic 
functionalities (and, therefore, knows that the system can or 
cannot cope). These issues are not often relected in research 
which uses questionnaires with rather general questions 
about trust. This diference between opinions as measured 
via questionnaires and signs of trust when experiencing 
automated driving has also been described as the Trust Fall 
(Miller et al. 2016). An explanation, as provided in Miller 
et al. (2016), is that in questionnaires more time is available 
to come to a decision. A third explanation is that in question-
naires there is no direct risk perceived in case of automation 
failure (Lee 1991; Muir and Moray 1996). Miller and col-
leagues found diferences between what people claim they 
will do in a questionnaire and what they actually do when 
confronted with that situation in a driving simulator. Many 
people intervened with the automated systems in a simula-
tor even though they had stated in the questionnaires that 
they thought the system could handle the situation. However, 
there were also people that did not act even when they had 
indicated that the car could not handle the situation.
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Since trust evolves over time, based on experience with 
these systems and knowledge that people have about these 
systems and perceived risk (risk awareness), there is a poten-
tial role for HMI. Designing an HMI that guides the driver in 
actual driving conditions under speciic settings and encour-
ages appropriate trust is in our view of crucial importance to 
ensure safe and comfortable use.
5  Stimulate appropriate level of attention 
and intervention
The appropriate level of attention and intervention is 
directly related to the level of safety we require. Theo-
retically, if the desired level of safety were merely that 
the number of accidents and conlicts should not increase 
compared to manual driving, then the required level of 
attention could potentially be set accordingly. However, as 
Toyota Research Institute chief executive Gill Pratt stated 
in the Sydney Morning Herald (16th of February 2017), 
one of the key challenges is: “how safe is safe enough”? 
He claims that it is unlikely that people will accept a sig-
niicant number of deaths attributable to autonomous vehi-
cles that we do accept from human drivers. So as long as 
vehicles need some level of control from a human, creat-
ing the right level of attention to allow a safe intervention 
when needed is vital.
If the reliability of the system is continuously and accu-
rately known, we could know the level of attention that 
may be required at any moment in time. However, this 
does not seem realistic since a system may fail or unex-
pected situations may arise due to weather, other traic 
participants or an obstacle on the road. In addition, it is not 
acceptable in terms of comfort and workload to continu-
ously interfere with the attention level, allowing secondary 
tasks for some seconds, asking for eyes on the road for the 
next 10 s and allowing the driver engage in other activities 
shortly after.
In general, it is fair to say that, with the level of tech-
nology commercially available today, driver attention to 
the road needs to be as high as during manual driving 
to ensure the highest level of safety. However, there is a 
diference between the level of attention that is formally 
required and the level of attention that seems reasonable 
to expect based on human factors expertise. The higher 
the reliability of the system as experienced by the driver, 
the lower will be the attention level of the driver, and the 
higher the impact of a failure or system limitation. It can 
also be argued that, from the human perspective there is 
a major diference between being coupled to the vehicle 
via some active control and being decoupled and simply 
monitoring the operation of the vehicle and of the vehicle 
systems. This distinction is illustrated in Fig. 3. Under 
manual driving, both loops operate, but under automated 
driving, especially at level 2, only the outer loop is (sup-
posed to be) present. So, we can deduce that there are two 
levels of being “out of the loop”: being removed from the 
control loop, and being removed from both the control and 
the monitoring loops.
Here the relections of Bainbridge (1983) are highly 
apposite:
We know from many ‘vigilance’ studies … that it is 
impossible for even a highly motivated human being 
to maintain efective visual attention towards a source 
of information on which very little happens, for more 
than about half an hour. This means that it is humanly 
impossible to carry out the basic function of monitor-
ing for unlikely abnormalities, which, therefore, has 
to be done by an automatic alarm system connected 
to sound signals.
A more serious irony is that the automatic control sys-
tem has been put in because it can do the job better 
than the operator, but yet the operator is being asked 
to monitor that it is working efectively.
One relevant question here is whether users will inter-
pret being removed from the control loop as implying no 
need to monitor. Hands-of driving is likely to be equated 
with no need to monitor continuously, so that in effect 
hands-of leads to eyes-of, which is a further irony. That 
efect was observed by Carsten et al. (2012) in a driving 
simulator experiment where participants were given the 
freedom to engage in a range of secondary when they so 
choose. Those participants who had previously experienced 
a hands-of lane-keeping system together with ACC were 
willing to watch a video for 43% of their motorway driving 
time when in “high automation” (combination of ACC and 
Fig. 3  The monitoring and control loops
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lane-keeping). They did this entirely voluntarily—there was 
no encouragement to do so.
From a user’s perspective, it is perfectly logical that a 
system that takes over lateral control by keeping the vehicle 
in its lane means that one does not have to steer oneself. It 
does not make sense to have a system that performs a task 
for you but where you still need to do at least some of the 
task. And if the vehicle can keep the vehicle in its lane, why 
does the driver need to keep the hands on the wheel? It is a 
consequence of which the vehicle manufacturers are aware; 
hence the issuance of warnings when a hands-of state is 
detected for a certain amount of time.
Although this is often being sold as required for legal 
reasons only, the basis lies in safety. Since current SAE level 
2 systems are still fallible at fairly unpredictable moments in 
time, it is not yet feasible to indicate in suicient time when 
the human is needed. Thus, timely warnings to take back 
control cannot (yet) be provided. This necessitates constant 
monitoring by the human, so that a system that is supposed 
to be relaxing may actually be quite demanding.
Diferent OEMs use diferent strategies for counteracting 
the efects of being out of the control loop and hence also out 
of the monitoring loop. Commercially available vehicles at 
this moment provide a symbol of a green/yellow or a blue 
steering wheel to indicate the system is switched on by the 
driver. However, since hands on wheel is still (formally) 
required, the vehicles will provide a warning when the 
hands are not on the wheel. The timing of the warning for 
hands of wheel difers between brands, with times varying 
between some seconds and even some minutes. Some brands 
show a yellow/orange steering wheel if a driver needs to get 
his hands on the wheel, with or without auditory warnings. 
Examples of the interface of the BMW 7 series are shown 
in Fig. 4. The yellow icon is shown about 4 s after taking 
the hands of the wheel without any auditory warning. If 
the driver does not put his hands on the wheel, the steering 
wheel turns red with an auditory warning and the automated 
steering is switched of (after about 25–40 s hands of in 
total).
For the Volvo V90, one can keep the hands of the wheel 
for about 12 s without any warnings. The irst visual warning 
is issued without any auditory cue. After 5 s a soft tone is 
played, and 5 s later the system is deactivated with a warning 
sound and text showing it has been de-activated. Examples 
of the visual display are shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 4  Visual interface for the BMW 7 series (Photos copyright UTAC CERAM and FONDATION MAIF)
Fig. 5  Visual display of the V90 for hands on wheel required and system de-activated (Photos copyright UTAC CERAM and FONDATION 
MAIF)
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The Mercedes E class only requests hands back on the 
wheel after about 30 s, by means of displaying red hands on 
the steering icon. Thirty seconds later (so about 1 min after 
the irst hands-of wheel), the car will actually start using 
acoustic signals. If no action is taken, the auditory warnings 
become more intrusive and in the end the vehicle will auto-
matically reduce speed and bring the car to a complete stop 
within its lane. Note that some brands actually only require 
hands on the wheel, while others require an actual steering 
input, whether or not that input is appropriate. The visual 
interface of the Mercedes E Class and the Tesla Model S is 
shown in Fig. 6.
In the case of the Tesla Model S, the hands of wheel time 
is about 3 min before a text message “hold steering wheel” 
is shown (Tenez le volant) without any sound warning. The 
outer line of the display starts lashing with decreasing inter-
vals. About 15 s after the irst visual warning, the system 
starts to beep. The steering wheel symbol is now grey and 
warning beeps increase in intensity and with smaller inter-
vals. About 15 s after the irst auditory warning the system 
will cause the vehicle to brake, play continuous warning 
sounds and show that Autosteer is no longer available for 
the rest of the drive. These additional consequence of not 
being able to switch the system on for the rest of the drive 
and bringing the vehicle to a standstill were not installed in 
the irst version of Tesla Autopilot that featured in the vehi-
cle involved in the Florida fatal crash in 2016. This has now 
been changed in the latest update of Tesla (NTSB 2017). 
Note that these warnings all concern planned warnings for 
hands-of wheel. When automated steering is deactivated 
by the system because of system limitations, some systems 
warn with an auditory warning, some fall out of automation 
silently (visual icon change only) and some systems provide 
an auditory cue only when the hands are of the wheel.
When referring to inattention in driving, secondary tasks 
and driver distraction are often discussed. Driver distraction 
is deined as a diversion of attention away from activities 
critical for safe driving towards a competing activity (Lee 
et al. 2008). However, how distraction afects traic safety 
while driving with automated functions may be diferent 
than in the case of manual driving. While several studies 
have shown that long glances away from the front view have 
a direct efect on accident risk (e.g. Klauer et al. 2010; Liang 
et al. 2012), this will be slightly diferent with automated 
functions. Under normal conditions, we need to almost con-
tinuously monitor the road to keep the vehicle in lane and 
avoid colliding with lead or opposing vehicles. However, 
with automated systems, the level of attention or distraction 
could in theory be tuned to the level of reliability of the 
automation under these conditions. This would mean that, 
under conditions in which the system were able to reliably 
control the vehicle, the driver could be distracted or have a 
decreased level of attention without any safety consequence. 
However, to allow a suicient level of attention and, there-
fore, appropriate intervention, various features are required:
1. When the system is known to have limitations within a 
speciic drive from one instant to the next, as is the case 
with SAE level 2 systems, the driver should be almost 
continuously monitoring the outer world. The driver 
should be able to detect when the system is deviating 
from the required path or not responding in correspond-
ence with what a driver considers to be safe. There can 
even be a transition from perfectly being able to keep 
the vehicle within lane boundaries on a straight road to 
system failure when entering a curve or not detecting a 
lead vehicle from one instance to the next. Since these 
changes in performance depend on the road and traic 
circumstances, the driver should continuously be moni-
toring the exterior world to detect any of these changes. 
However, for intervention, eyes on the road and mind 
on the road is not suicient, drivers should also have 
their foot ready (braking pedal), and two (minimum 
one) hands on the steering wheel. Especially in case of 
entering a curve with high speed, overruling the system 
should be done instantly to keep the vehicle on the road. 
This situation is highly critical and it is hard to explain 
to the driver why the vehicle cannot deal with these tight 
curves despite the road being a motorway, having clear 
road markings. It may even be that a driver experienced 
the system working ine in that same curve due to the 
fact that speeds were lower and there was a lead vehicle 
that reduced its speed because of the curve. To limit 
this time, hands should be at the wheel at all time when 
Fig. 6  Visual interface of the 
Mercedes E (left) and the 
Tesla Model S (right) (Photos 
copyright UTAC CERAM and 
FONDATION MAIF)
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systems have some chance to fail and visual attention 
should be on the road. However, as we claimed already, 
this is not very acceptable from a user point of view 
while driving in partially automated mode. And even if 
drivers have their hands on the wheel and are looking 
outside, the driver should be warned with an auditory 
warning if the system falls out of automation.
2. Systems that are known to be unsafe in very speciic 
conditions should be able to detect these conditions. If 
the system is only to be used on high quality roads it 
should realise what sort of road it is driving on and not 
allow activation on other road types. If the system only 
works at lower speeds, it should be linked to the driving 
speed and act if these conditions are not met (not allow 
activation at higher speeds or not allow higher speeds 
when activated). With the current systems commercially 
available, this is often just described in the manual or in 
small notiications on the display, but activation is often 
still possible on lower quality roads. The restriction to 
lower speeds is generally included in the design of the 
system, combined with an active warning to the driver. 
This approach is to be preferred.
6  Minimise automation surprises
A well-designed automation system should have the capac-
ity to be able to predict insofar as possible when it can no 
longer handle an environment or situation and, therefore, 
requires human takeover. And the human should be (pre-) 
alerted by that prediction, so as to minimise surprise. For 
level 2 systems, this means that a driver should at least be 
alerted when the systems falls out of automation. For SAE 
level 3 and 4 systems, that means that a vehicle should 
provide timely information to the driver prior to reaching 
an operational boundary, for example prior to exit from 
a motorway onto lower quality roads or city streets. The 
human will, provided adequate notiication is given, hope-
fully be ready to take back control. This may be a chal-
lenge in terms of HMI design. However, most navigation 
systems provide preview of the road and route ahead. For 
level 3 and 4 systems, there is a need for the system to 
inform that it cannot cope, why it cannot cope and provide 
a countdown to the required takeover. An electronic hori-
zon (preview of the upcoming road) and geofencing is an 
essential element here, and had it been applied would have 
been one means to prevent the Tesla intersection crash 
on 7 May 2016 in Florida, since the Tesla Autopilot sys-
tem was known to be incapable of safe negotiation of an 
intersection.
A specific type of surprise, known as “automation 
surprise” has irst been deined in the aviation domain 
(Sarter et  al. 1997; Woods et  al. 1994; Dekker 2009). 
Dekker (2009) used the following deinition: “The auto-
mation does something without immediately preceding 
crew input related to the automation’s action and in which 
that automation action is inconsistent with crew expecta-
tion”. Hurts and de Boer (2015) mention that this means 
that automation surprise may even take place before a 
pilot becomes aware of it. When linked to car driving and 
driving automation, we want to use the term automation 
surprise primarily for situations where the driver actually 
notices the action is inconsistent with drivers expectation. 
In theory, automation surprise may also be positive, with a 
system being able to handle a situation that the driver does 
not expect it to, but in terms of safety and human factors, 
the most interesting case is where a driver is negatively 
surprised by an action (or absence of action) of the auto-
mated system.
In this respect, we distinguish two diferent types of 
automation surprise:
• Absence of expected action: driver is surprised that the 
system does not perform a speciic action without any 
apparent safety risk or stress. Examples are the system 
not increasing speed when the speed limits goes up or 
not driving of after having come to a standstill when 
the lead car starts moving, or not changing lane when 
the indicator is switched on.
• Presence of unexpected action: driver is surprised 
because the system performs an action that is not in 
correspondence to what a driver expects and provides 
the driver with an increase in arousal and stress. Exam-
ples are accelerating when leaving the motorway ahead 
of a curve in the absence of (the detection of) a lead 
vehicle, not decreasing speed on approach to a traic 
light in the absence of a lead vehicle, or increasing 
speed when the driver turns on the indicator in antici-
pation of a lane change. This second category may lead 
to imminent danger if a driver is not fully aware of the 
operational envelop of the vehicle, his/her attention 
level is too low and if subsequent the response from 
the driver is rather brusque.
Automation surprise of the second kind always needs 
to be avoided because of the safety risk involved. This 
means that drivers should be aware of vehicle capabilities, 
have timely warnings and need to be monitoring the road 
at proper times to recognise that a situation is not accord-
ing to what they expect. As Johnson et al. (2014) have 
described, the best interface will fail for the user if system 
operation is not observable, predictable and directable at 
an appropriate level of granularity and timeliness.
Thus the following four qualities can be seen to be 
important in an HMI to minimise automation surprise:
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Observability (can a driver understand or detect system 
status, such as system mode and if the system receives the 
required information). In this, the HMI can play an impor-
tant role by providing speciic signals and vehicle behav-
iour to have a driver understand what the system does and 
does not do. An interesting new concept is the idea of a 
“health bar” indicating the self-driving vehicle’s techni-
cal reliability. However, it is questionable whether self-
diagnosis for a failing technical system is really useful. 
At this moment, the HMI often displays the current state 
and whether the required information is being detected. 
However, it does not predict that the system cannot cope 
with the same situation in 0.002 s, and often, the system 
indicates it detects the required road markings but still 
drives out of the lane.
Predictability (the actions of the system should be suf-
iciently observable, understandable and reliable so that a 
driver can plan his/her own actions accordingly). In this, 
the HMI should help the driver predict, when being con-
fronted with a situation if a system can cope or cannot cope. 
This is highly correlated with whether the system fails in 
speciic situations that are clearly deined (e.g. road works) 
or whether the exact system boundaries are less clearly 
deined (e.g. being able to cope with some curves but not 
all), depending also on the set speed and the presence of a 
lead vehicle.
Directability (the ability to inluence and be inluenced 
to come to the best joint performance). This directly links to 
both explicit and implicit commands provided by the HMI, 
both from the driver to the system and vice versa. This also 
means that a system should accept and use and interpret 
speciic user input and maybe even decide to ignore that 
input if this improves safety.
Timeliness (is the information or warning provided early 
enough so that the driver can take proper action). In this 
case, information needs to be provided earlier when a driver 
has been out of the loop than when a driver has actively 
been monitoring the outer world and has his/her hands on 
the wheel.
7  Provide comfort to the human user, i.e. 
reduce uncertainty and stress
Providing comfort to the user is one of the selling arguments 
for automated functions. Marketing automated functions as 
comfort systems instead of safety systems also implicitly 
suggests that the driver is still responsible for safe driving. 
However, with increasing levels of automation, ofering 
comfort may go beyond ofering driver support. Additional 
comfort may be ofered by allowing the person in the vehicle 
the possibility to do something else than driving and using 
time in a more valuable way.
Comfort contains both a physical and a psychological 
component, although a comprehensive deinition of ride 
comfort is lacking (Kudritzki 1999). The deinition that we 
will use for driver comfort is “the subjective feeling of pleas-
antness of driving/riding in a vehicle in the absence of both 
physiological and psychological stress”. Physical comfort 
is related to elements such as vehicle or seat vibrations (e.g. 
Kudritzki 1999), forces on the body (lateral and longitudinal 
accelerations), the design of the chair, position of the seat 
(for an overview see Wertheim and Hogema 1997). Psycho-
logical comfort refers to more subjective feelings of ease 
or pleasantness (or lack of unpleasantness). Note that both 
physical and psychological comfort are highly subjective and 
vary from person to person. Most studies reporting comfort 
of driving with automated functions do not provide a deini-
tion of comfort.
7.1  Physical comfort
With respect to accelerations, comfort is not necessarily a 
function of stimulus strength. A very important intervening 
factor is time. A slight stimulus may not cause any discom-
fort when it is brief, but if it lasts long enough, or occurs 
often enough, it may certainly begin to cause discomfort 
after a while (Wertheim and Hogema 1997). Kudritzki 
(1999) addressed that the experienced comfort (in his case 
vibrations) is also related to expectations. When someone 
sees a smooth road surface, (s)he also expects a lack of 
vibrations, making vibrations even less comfortable when 
they do occur. In terms of automated driving, one can imag-
ine that this efect of expectations of vehicle behaviour on 
comfort will also be present. If an automated vehicle does 
not behave the way people expect, discomfort may result. 
For instance, under normal manual driving conditions, spe-
ciic lateral and longitudinal forces on the body are avoided 
by drivers. While approaching a signalised intersection, driv-
ers tend not to stop when the required deceleration exceeds 
3–3.5 ms2 at the time of amber onset (Baguley 1988; Niit-
tymaki and Pursula 1994; van der Horst and Wilmink 1986). 
The design of the vehicle should respect these preferences 
in automated vehicle behaviour, although it is clear that a 
vehicle under automated control cannot violate a red light. 
In more extreme scenarios, uncomfortable forces will be 
acceptable if they help avoid ending up in highly safety–crit-
ical situations. In this sense, the experienced comfort of a 
driver support system under normal conditions is valued dif-
ferently than under safety–critical conditions.
In discussing physical comfort, one concern with auto-
mated vehicles is potential motion sickness. Even though 
one can debate whether motion sickness is causing physical 
or psychological discomfort, we will discuss it as physical 
discomfort since the basis is not psychological by nature. 
Diels and Bos (2016) refer to this as self-driving motion 
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sickness, caused by an incongruence between what people 
feel and what they see. Especially in case of a person being 
engaged in non-driving activities or even being seated in 
a backward position in future automated vehicles, there is 
a risk of motion sickness. Watching something that does 
not correspond to what the organs or balance are feeling 
is a plausible cause for visually induced motion sickness 
(Bos et al. 2008). Diels et al. (2016) found that after 15 min 
of looking at a head-down display, 25% of the participants 
experienced some discomfort due to motion sickness. After 
35 min, this increased to 50%. For a head-up display, the 
percentages were almost half, with 13% after 15 min and 
27% after 35 min. This indicates that some solutions may be 
found in the position of tablets and screens.
Motion sickness is primarily related to horizontal accel-
erations caused by accelerating, braking and cornering 
(Guignard and McCauley 1990; Turner and Griin 1999a, 
b). Although there is some variation between people and 
circumstances, the onset time of signals for motion sick-
ness for passengers in normal vehicles is normally between 
10 and 20 min (O’Hanlon and McCauley 1974), indicating 
it is something that needs some time to build up. Besides 
discomfort, motion sickness may also pose serious threat to 
the performance in case of request to take back control. Diels 
and Bos (2016) write that this does not necessarily have to 
refer to a driver vomiting at the time of an emergency situa-
tion, but also to more subtle efects such as reduced situation 
awareness and increased response times. Motion sickness 
can be avoided by adjusting vehicle behaviour, adjusting 
the location or characteristics of the display or providing 
additional displays. These solutions will be discussed in 
Sect. 9.5.
7.2  Psychological comfort
Psychological comfort relates to being in a state of well-
being and hence minimising stress. Outside the driving 
context, being in one’s comfort zone has been described as 
a behavioural state within which a person operates in an 
anxiety-neutral condition, using a limited set of behaviours 
to deliver a steady level of performance, usually without a 
sense of risk (White 2009). There is also extensive literature 
on stress from the driving situation, e.g. Gstalter (1985) and 
Desmond and Matthews (2009).
For automated functions, the typical measure of psycho-
logical comfort is the subjective indication of the ease or 
pleasantness of use, related to whether the vehicle performs 
in a manner congruent to the wishes of the user. Psychologi-
cal comfort is experienced when the drivers feels at ease, has 
conidence that the vehicle will exhibit the right behaviour 
and is driving to the right destination without losing control.
Since automated driving is relatively new, not too many 
people have had the chance to experience it, and since it 
has various diferent forms, people may feel uncomfortable 
with its behaviour due to uncertainty about its capabili-
ties. De Vos et al. (1997) already found that comfort levels 
decreased with decreasing headway in automated vehicle 
platooning. However it is very plausible that, when people 
get more experience with platooning and gain more trust, 
shorter headways would also be experienced as comfortable. 
This may also hold for speciic automated vehicle behaviour. 
It is, therefore, highly likely that in the case of automated 
vehicles, psychological comfort would be related to the pre-
dictability of the vehicle’s actions and the trust that it will 
cope with the situation, and that it will change with time 
and experience.
Since expectations may be based on experience of man-
ual driving, and driving styles vary from driver to driver, 
one could wonder if an automated vehicle should behave 
somewhat similarly to manual driving. Initial studies show 
that drivers do not want the automated system to copy their 
precise driving behaviour. De Gelder et al. (2016) showed 
a clear diversity of preference between drivers in real-life 
driving situations with ACC. Interestingly, driver comfort 
is not highest when the system copies the personal driv-
ing style. The authors claim that this may be the result of 
a lack of conidence of the driver in the ACC. This makes 
sense. When approaching a situation in manual driving, the 
driver knows what he will do. In case of vehicle automa-
tion, a driver only knows what the vehicle will do after it 
starts to respond and/or with proper information or feedback. 
For instance, when an automated vehicle is about to change 
lane, the driver needs to be reassured that it has sensed all 
required information and that it will only change lane when 
safe. In addition, to reduce uncertainty and stress, and thus 
psychological discomfort, automated vehicles should behave 
according to the general traic rules and regulations. Sum-
mala (2007) refers to the importance of feeling in control for 
comfort in manual driving. With higher levels of automated 
vehicles, the driver is not in control, resulting in a feeling 
of discomfort if the driver does not trust the vehicle and, 
therefore, feels out of control. The way the vehicle behaves 
and the information it displays should provide the driver the 
feeling that the vehicle is in control and is behaving accord-
ing to predictable rules and explainable behaviour.
8  Usability
According to the ISO 9241 deinition, usability is the efec-
tiveness, eiciency and satisfaction with which speciied 
users achieve speciied goals in particular environments. 
Efectiveness in this case is the accuracy and completeness 
with which speciied users can achieve speciied goals in 
particular environments. Eiciency relates to the resources 
expended in relation to the accuracy and completeness of 
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goals achieved and satisfaction and acceptability of the work 
system to its users and other people afected by its use.
This clearly illustrates that usability of automated driving 
depends on its users and the system in a given context. The 
goal of automated driving is not so much diferent than the 
goal of manual driving, and that is to drive from A to B in a 
relatively safe manner with a relatively acceptable amount 
of resources. In the case of automated driving, the major 
gain for the driver relates to eiciency, that is the resources 
expended. If the system is as efective as the human driver, 
a person could spend less physical and cognitive resources 
to the driving task, making it more eicient. However, if 
the automated system is not so efective, or less efective 
than the human driver, this means that the system is less 
eicient and a driver should pay more attentional resources 
and workload may even increase if the driver is not exactly 
clear about the operational envelope of the system.
The HMI in all its aspects plays a major role in usabil-
ity—human interaction with the automation is mediated by 
the HMI. Road-vehicle HMI has evolved over the years to 
a point where there is a high degree of commonality and 
standardisation in the controls and displays. Some of that 
commonality is by standards or manufacturer agreement, 
but much has simply become standardised by tradition—
here the foot pedal positions, gearshift patterns for manual 
and automatic gearboxes (with some exceptions for reverse 
for manual gearboxes) and the position of the indicator 
stalk on the left side of the steering column can be cited as 
examples. Indeed, when manufacturers diverge from tradi-
tional layouts, safety problems can occur as a result. Thus in 
2016, the U.S. National Highway Traic Safety Administra-
tion required the recall by Fiat-Chrysler of over 1 million 
vehicles itted with an electronic control for the automatic 
gearbox (NHTSA 2016). The control had an unconventional 
layout that caused drivers to believe that they had set the 
gearbox in the Park position, when in fact they had not. 
NHTSA stated: “Although the Monostable gearshift has the 
familiar appearance of a conventional console mechanical 
gearshift assembly, it has an unfamiliar movement that does 
not provide the tactile or visual feedback that drivers are 
accustomed to receiving from conventional shifters… The 
Monostable design appears to violate several basic design 
guidelines for vehicle controls, such as: (1) be consistent; 
(2) controls and displays should function the way people 
expect them to function; (3) minimise what the user has to 
remember; and (4) operations that occur most often or have 
the greatest impact on driving safety should be the easiest 
to perform”.
Thus with “traditional” cars and trucks, controls and HMI 
tend to be consistent, and as with the Fiat-Chrysler example, 
deviations from convention are frowned upon. For driver 
assistance systems and for automated driving functions, 
there is currently no convention and little pressure towards 
consistency. It can be argued that there is no such consist-
ency in other transport modes, such as civil aviation and that 
the lack of consistency there has not been a hindrance to safe 
operation. However, in civil aviation, there are three major 
airframe manufacturers worldwide, and there is a common 
design philosophy within each manufacturer such as Boe-
ing and Airbus (Sarter and Woods 1997). Additionally, 
aircrews receive intensive training on each speciic aircraft 
type, although within a manufacturer types may be grouped 
for the purposes of a pilot’s “type rating” on account of their 
similarity (EASA 2017). By contrast, in road vehicles there 
is a substantial number of manufacturers with constantly 
changing vehicle models and types, produced to be oper-
ated by a very large range of mainly non-professional driv-
ers, who normally receive no training in the operation of a 
speciic vehicle. With the gradual introduction of automated 
driving features, diferent vehicles will have diferent auto-
mated driving capabilities, and each vehicle will also vary 
Fig. 7  Dashboard display for Volvo V90 Lane Keeping System (left) 
and Peugeot 3008 Lane Keep Assist (right). The red lane line on the 
Peugeot screen indicates that the driver is steering too close to the 
left-side lane boundary in hands-on driving, which the vehicle will 
then try to correct. This is also indicated by a lashing amber warning 
(top right)
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in its capability depending on road type, road layout and 
environmental conditions. To this can be added the chal-
lenge of a lack of any standardisation of HMI so far. Indeed 
the opposite is the case—each manufacturer is showing dif-
ferent concepts.
This proliferation of HMI designs can already be wit-
nessed in current production models which ofer level 2 sys-
tems. Thus, the Volvo V90 shows the status of the lane-keep-
ing function of its “Pilot Assist” via a steering wheel symbol 
within the speedometer, while the Peugeot 3008 indicates for 
its Active Lane Keeping Assistance which road marking (left 
and/or right) it can detect (green) and also which one is at 
risk of being crossed (orange). When a road marking cannot 
be detected, it is displayed as grey (Fig. 7).
At the moment, these diferences may not be very impor-
tant, but it can also be noted that the switchgear to activate 
the various level 2 systems also varies considerably between 
manufacturers. This has the potential to cause driver con-
fusion and error when driving an unfamiliar vehicle, for 
example a rental car or a vehicle provided through a car 
share scheme.
9  Implications for HMI design
The road to automated driving ofers various challenges at 
various phases. Fortunately, there are solutions for most of 
the Human Factors issues, with an extensive role for the 
HMI in the widest sense of the word. This article tries to 
raise the importance of HMI in moving to a safe and com-
fortable joint cognitive system, in which the vehicle and 
the driver cooperate for the best performance. In the cur-
rent SAE documents, including the more recent expanded 
version (SAE 2016) HMI is not speciically mentioned, 
apart from a cursory mention of a malfunction indication 
message in that expanded version. So while the human 
is mentioned, the human’s information needs are not 
addressed.
To design for a safe and comfortable HMI, it is impor-
tant to realise that the various topics that we described 
per chapter are related and what may ofer a solution to 
one issue may not be beneicial for another issue. There-
fore, in Fig. 8, we provide a simpliied model of the most 
important concepts described in this paper. Often, a tech-
nical solution is used to overcome human factors issues 
of inattention or trust in the assumption that if the sys-
tem gets more reliable, most human factors issues will be 
solved. However, up to level 5 with full automation with-
out any attentional requirement of the driver, the model 
as presented below will still hold. The igure shows that 
if the technical system’s reliability increases, this is ben-
eicial for comfort and trust, with both aspects increas-
ing. However, response times will also increase, as well 
as automation surprise, both with potential negative safety 
impacts. Note that with an increase in system reliability, 
the frequency of automation surprise will decrease, but 
the impact when it occurs will be more severe. Situational 
awareness and vigilance (attention) will decrease as well 
as trust calibration. The mere fact that situational aware-
ness and attention decrease is not necessarily unsafe. If 
the situational awareness and amount of attention is tuned 
to the actual system reliability, or the HMI can improve 
situational awareness and attention in a timely manner, 
the system is properly designed. Here, it noteworthy that 
Endsley (2015) speciically advocates the improvement of 
user interfaces rather than the application of decision tools 
or remedial skills training as the appropriate countermeas-
ure to problems in operator situation awareness. However, 
it can also be predicted that, the more reliable a system 
gets, the higher the chance of overtrust (although one is 
confronted with the consequences less frequently but more 
intensively, as is the case with automation surprise).
9.1  Provide required understanding of the AV 
capabilities and status (minimise mode errors)
The vehicle cannot tell the driver about every activity that 
it is performing or provide detailed information on sensor 
performance. A balance needs to be struck between at one 
extreme an over-sparse HMI display that provides minimal 
Fig. 8  Human Factors in auto-
mated driving model, showing 
the interdependencies of human 
factors concepts when changing 
system reliability
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understanding and at the other extreme information overload 
from multiple constantly changing status displays.
It is possible to infer what are some absolute information 
needs:
• Is my vehicle carrying out longitudinal control?
• Is my vehicle, in addition to the longitudinal task, car-
rying out lateral control? When lateral and longitudinal 
control are ofered at level 2 (low level of reliability), 
information should be actively provided that the hands 
need to be on the steering wheel and this should be moni-
tored almost continuously.
• Is longitudinal or lateral control being switched of, either 
by me or by the system? This should be actively commu-
nicated by means of at least auditory and visual feedback.
• Can my vehicle perform desired manoeuvres—change 
lane, overtake, handle a roundabout?
• Can my vehicle change the indicated route?
• Am I or am I not allowed to divert attention to an info-
tainment activity or even to fall asleep?
• Will the vehicle warn me in due time when I need to take 
over control?
Here there is a sharp divide between being coupled to 
vehicle control (in particular being responsible for steering) 
and not being coupled and so being only in the monitoring 
loop of information processing. That would seem to war-
rant a change on the overall “look” or theme of the displays, 
as has been efected in some prototype vehicles. Thus the 
“look” should change from an indication of some responsi-
bility for control, to responsibility for monitoring alone, to 
no current responsibility for control or supervision.
In addition, drivers expect that when hands-of operation 
is possible, it is also safe. Even though information may be 
ofered that the lane keeping system does not detect the road 
markings/lane edges at the required level, this is not infor-
mation the driver will be able to act upon without additional 
warnings. HMI solutions would be to:
• Only allow the system to be enabled on roads in which 
there is a high possibility of the system functioning well. 
This can be done by means of geofencing or by means 
of using more advanced sensors to detect if the required 
conditions are met. If they are not met, the system cannot 
be switched on.
• Switch the system of when the required conditions are 
not met continuously for more than couple of seconds 
and provide a clear (not just visual but also auditory) 
warning that the system will switch of. Note that this can 
only be done safely with systems in which drivers have 
their hands on the wheel.
• Use an icon for lane keeping with hands on wheel and 
only allow hands of for a couple of seconds.
• Use uncomfortable consequences if the driver does not 
keep his hands on the wheel when required (slowing 
down, intrusive warnings, swerving in the lane, not being 
able to use the system for the rest of the drive)
• For higher levels of automation, the system can allow 
the driver to be temporarily out of the loop. To build 
up trust, a more advanced display can be shown about 
where the vehicle is going (navigational information, turn 
information) and about what it detects around the vehi-
cle. However, this display should not ofer just passive 
information about when the driver should take over. This 
should actively be communicated by the system.
The most self-explaining design for a user would be 
only to be able to switch the system on when it can also 
work properly and attention can be temporarily diverted 
elsewhere.
9.2  Engender correct calibration of trust
An HMI to support appropriate calibration of trust should 
have:
1. Observability—the HMI should help the human to 
understand what the vehicle senses and perceives when 
a system cannot cope with a situation, e.g. that it is not 
receiving required information on presence of road 
markings.
2. Predictability—the HMI should allow the human to pre-
dict, when confronted with a situation, whether or not 
the system can cope
3. Directability—the HMI should have the ability to inlu-
ence the user and be inluenced by the user to come to 
the best joint performance
4. Timeliness—the information should be provided early 
enough so that the human can take proper action.
9.3  Stimulate appropriate level of attention 
and intervention
The HMI should ensure that the level of attention that a 
driver is paying to the driving task is suitable for the level 
of automation. Hands-of driving is not compatible with 
requiring attention since we know that hands-of often leads 
to attention-of. We, therefore, recommend the following 
guidelines:
• Level 2 systems should require drivers to keep their 
hands on the wheel almost continuously.
• The system should allow activation only on roads that 
are suitable for that category of automation and at level 
2, when hands are of the wheel, the system should warn 
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intrusively, it should monitor if the eyes are on the road 
and should come with consequence if hands are not 
on wheel (e.g. deteriorated lane keeping performance, 
switching of after intrusive warnings, slowing down the 
vehicle or not being able to switch the system of for a 
longer period of time).
• Functions that ofer a lane change should always check 
if there is no traic in the adjacent lane and if there is 
no fast approaching traic in this lane. Ofering a lane 
change without this check is highly dangerous.
• Particularly for automation of levels 3 and 4, where 
driver attention is temporarily not required, a diferent 
dashboard design can be provided, although no informa-
tion is not recommendable. Although formally the driver 
does not need any information at that moment, it is rather 
unlikely that the human will be comfortable with that.
• When the vehicle is to provide a driver with a timely 
request to take back control, the system should have 
advanced possibilities to detect what the driver is doing 
(driver attention and secondary task monitoring) and 
predict how long it will take before the driver is able to 
take back control. With this information the system can 
anticipate and take additional measures such as braking 
to allow more time and prevent unsafe situations.
• Ideally, the vehicle should control what the driver is 
doing, so for instance being able to shut down a tablet 
if attention needs to be to the outer world. Additional 
displays such as head-up displays to direct attention to 
the location of a potential hazard may help.
For level 4 automation in public transport, the human 
should not have any other role than passenger and, there-
fore, it is not wise to provide any information about the 
technical capabilities of the vehicle other than for demon-
stration purposes. When boarding a bus, we do not ask the 
driver for his driver’s license; we just trust that he or she 
will be able to drive safely.
9.4  Minimise automation surprises
To minimise automation surprise, the following design 
principles need to be taken into account:
• Allow activation only in situations in which the func-
tions work well. This is what people expect. In case of 
the lane change function, drivers will not understand if 
the system changes lanes automatically without proper 
checks, leaving the responsibility of blind spot detec-
tion to the driver. Even if the driver indicates willing-
ness to change lane, the system should check whether 
it is safe to do so. When a function can be switched on, 
it should work well, with geofencing ofering a proper 
solution.
• If the system is not working reliably (e.g. from limitations 
or errors in sensors), this should be actively communi-
cated by not allowing hands of the wheel, by degrading 
lateral performance so that the driver will notice, slow-
ing the vehicle down and intrusive warnings. For higher 
levels of automation (levels 3 and 4), the driver should 
always receive a timely warning to take back control to 
avoid automation surprise. The system should be self-
aware about possible limitations and act accordingly by 
asking the driver to take back control or slow down. In 
addition, the system should inform the driver that it can-
not cope, why it cannot cope and provide a countdown to 
the required takeover. An electronic horizon (preview of 
the upcoming road) and geofencing is again an essential 
element here.
Automation surprise will be reduced if the systems act 
according to rules that are simple to explain and are predict-
able for a driver. Predictability for higher levels of automa-
tion would be assisted by a display showing what is about 
to happen, for example a lane change or other manoeuvre. 
Since the look-ahead feature is already common in naviga-
tion systems, the displays used can be imitated.
9.5  Provide comfort to the human user, i.e. reduce 
uncertainty and stress
There is a ine balance to be drawn between information 
overload and consequent stress and information that is too 
sparse with consequent uncertainty. Because the perfor-
mance of the sensor suite is so critical (as it is in human 
driving), an HMI that shows what the vehicle is “seeing” 
(roadway, lane markings, surrounding traic) would seem 
to be highly desirable in case of higher levels of automa-
tion. With lower levels of automation (level 2), attention of 
the driver should be on the road, so displays should only be 
ofering minimal information and preferably by means of a 
head-up display.
For a driver to feel physically and psychologically com-
fortable in an automated vehicle, there needs to be smooth 
and predictable driving behaviour with a minimum of 
changes in lateral and longitudinal speed. Ofering additional 
visual information in the form of an artiicial enhancement 
of a visual scene or by means of a head-up display showing 
the vehicle’s future trajectory, the mental model of the driver 
can be improved. To avoid motion sickness with automated 
vehicles (the driver doing other tasks than looking outside), 
vehicle motions around 0.16 Hz should be avoided, occu-
pants should be able to anticipate the vehicle’s motion tra-
jectory and incongruent visual-vestibular self-motion cues 
should be avoided. Displays showing content not related to 
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the outside world should be located near the line of sight out 
of the front window and display size should be limited to 
allow suicient peripheral visual information. These recom-
mendations are all described in Diels et al. (2016).
In addition, when vehicles are so advanced that they can 
detect what the driver is doing and how (s)he is positioned 
in the vehicle, the vehicle movements can be adjusted to this. 
This means that when the vehicle detects the driver is read-
ing, the vehicle may change to a more defensive way of driv-
ing without any lane changes and to lower speeds in curves.
9.6  Be usable
Many current level 2 systems have over-complex menu sys-
tems and multi-function switches. There is a big virtue in 
simplicity and in commonality of controls between difer-
ent vehicle makes and models. The number of automation 
modes that it is possible for the user to select should be 
minimised. Some basic usability solutions can be found in 
the following recommendations:
• Use a standardised symbol for automated driving.
• Use a standardised symbol for lane keeping with hands 
on (include that in the symbol).
• The system should be easy to learn and remember, which 
implies that it should also be easy to switch between 
vehicle makes and models, implying a high level of com-
monality in display format.
• Switching the functions on should be by means of a dou-
ble action, either simultaneously (such as pressing on two 
buttons or paddle) or in sequence to avoid any acciden-
tal activation and consequent automation surprise. How-
ever, such a two-step approach should never be used as a 
means to conirm that the user has compensated for the 
deiciencies of an automated system.
• The system should always be able to indicate if the sys-
tem is potentially available (you can switch it on if you 
want to).
• The system should be able to anticipate and let the driver 
know in due time when it will not be available anymore.
• The system functions should be linked to the map to 
increase functionality, help understand limitations and 
provide the driver with the proper preview.
• System and driver should always work together to solve 
potential danger. When the system detects a hazardous 
situation and, therefore, braking is needed, the system 
should not allow switching of by a braking action from 
the driver. However, in this case, the system actually gets 
two signals that braking is needed, so the two braking 
actions should be used together to avoid a collision. A 
driver should not always be allowed to overrule a system. 
If the system knows that a driver’s action will lead to 
danger, the actual driver input may need to be ignored or 
limited.
• Information should always be presented in due time, 
especially a take-over request.
• When the system is automatically switched of there 
should always be an active auditory warning to alert the 
driver of a change in status.
10  Conclusions
With vehicles getting more and more automated functions, it 
is important that a driver still understands what the vehicle 
can and cannot do and that the vehicle still understands what 
the driver can and cannot do. Ideally, the vehicle and human 
can be seen as a joint cognitive system, with both elements 
collaborating to deliver safe and comfortable driving. The 
main communication means between vehicle and human in 
that collaboration is the human–machine interface (HMI). 
Even though in many cases, HMI is used for describing 
visual interfaces, we propose that the HMI cannot be seen 
narrowly. Besides visual displays it also includes auditory 
displays and all the vehicle controls, including the traditional 
feel transmitted by pedals and steering, but also the vehicle’s 
dynamics within a speciic context and additional haptic ele-
ments—resistance, pulses, vibrations, physical guidance—
used to guide and assist the human.
The HMI in the broad sense of the word can, therefore, 
be seen as the window between human and machine. It gives 
the vehicle insight into the commands and attention of the 
human, and gives the human insight into automation modes, 
system state and system intention. Finally, it is responsible 
for handover requests in either direction. The HMI thus has 
a central and critical role in the operation of the joint sys-
tem. This paper has pointed out some of the human factors 
requirements for good design of the HMI. It has not made 
speciic recommendations on detailed design aspects, but 
has nevertheless points out some of the anomalies in the 
current designs that are already on the market. It can be 
argued that we are on a steep learning curve here, with rap-
idly evolving system capabilities, but that is hardly an excuse 
for ignoring the principles of good design and the role of 
that good design in ensuring the safety of the vehicle under 
automated operation.
The use of standardised symbols for automated func-
tions calls for addressing the issue of alternative designs 
for the same needs. That may be beneicial in terms of good 
designs eventually supplanting poorer ones, but it may also 
cause confusion and human error as drivers switch from one 
vehicle to another. This calls for an independent programme 
or committee that should identify the best solutions to the 
various challenges, and then promulgate those solutions in 
the form of collective agreements and standards. That task 
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is urgent, as the longer there is a lack of commonality and a 
failure to achieve “conventionality”, the more proliferation 
of alternative approaches there will be. Standardisation will 
provide an important means to assisting drivers to under-
stand their automated cars.
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